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Construction contract

Pursuant to section 64 of the BIF Act, a "construction contract" is defined as:

Section 64 BIF Act – Definitions
64 Definitions for chapter

construction contract means a contract, agreement or other arrangement under which 1 party undertakes to carry out construction work for, or to supply related goods and services to, another party.

The existence of a valid construction contract between the claimant and respondent is a basic and essential requirement for a valid adjudication decision. In Brodyn Pty Ltd t/as Time Cost and Quality v Davenport (2004) 61 NSWLR 421, Hodgson JA (with whom Mason P and Giles JA agreed) identified at 441 [53] the basic and essential requirements for a valid adjudication determination under the NSW Act, the first of which was:

"1. The existence of a construction contract between the claimant and the respondent, to which the Act applies..."

This requirement applies equally under the BIF Act. In GCB Constructions Pty Ltd v SEQ Formwork Pty Ltd [2023] QSC 71, Burns J stated at [15]:

"...one of the essential jurisdictional requirements for a valid adjudication under the Building Industry Fairness (Security of Payment) Act 2017 is the existence of a 'construction contract' within the meaning of the Act."

If there is no construction contract, the adjudicator has no jurisdiction and any purported adjudication decision will be void.

What is a "contract, agreement or other arrangement"?

The definition of "construction contract" includes three elements: a contract, an agreement, or an "other arrangement". The use of the expression "other arrangement" indicates that the legislature intended the definition to extend beyond formal contracts.

In Machkevitch v Andrew Building Constructions [2012] NSWSC 546, McDougall J considered the meaning of "other arrangement" in the context of the NSW Act (which uses the term "contract or other arrangement"). His Honour stated at [17]-[19]:

"As a matter of language, it seems to be clear that the legislature intended that a 'construction contract' could include both a 'contract' (as that concept is known to and understood in law) and some 'other arrangement' that would not in law be regarded as contracts.

It seems to me, as a simple matter of reading the legislative words, that the concept of 'other arrangement' is something which goes beyond the concept of 'contract'.

No doubt, the legislature had in mind that, from time to time, work would be done pursuant to arrangements which might not be susceptible to classification as contracts, formal or informal. Clearly, it did not intend that the entitlement to payment should depend on the degree of formality in the arrangements pursuant to which work should be done."

This reasoning was adopted and applied in Queensland in GCB Constructions Pty Ltd v SEQ Formwork Pty Ltd [2023] QSC 71.

Does an "other arrangement" need to be legally enforceable?

There has been some debate in the case law about whether an "other arrangement" must give rise to a legally binding obligation.

In Lendlease Engineering Pty Ltd v Timecon Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 685, Ball J held at [29]-[38] that for a construction contract to constitute an "other arrangement" under the NSW Act, it must give rise to a legally binding obligation (though the obligation need not be contractual in nature). However, this decision was distinguished on its facts in later NSW cases.

The earlier view - that an "other arrangement" need not be legally enforceable - was expressed by Nicholas J in Okaroo Pty Limited v Vos Construction and Joinery Pty Limited [2005] NSWSC 45. This approach was endorsed by McDougall J in Machkevitch v Andrew Building Constructions [2012] NSWSC 546 at [70]-[71]:

"Mr Christie made a formal submission that the reasoning of Nicholas J in Okaroo from [44] to [55] was incorrect, to the extent that his Honour concluded that there was nothing in the definition of 'construction contract' in the Act, or otherwise in the Act, which required that an 'arrangement', for the purposes of the definition of 'construction contract', must be legally enforceable.

With respect, I think that his Honour's reasoning was correct. Even if I were of a different view, I would nonetheless follow it in circumstances where it has stood not only unchallenged and accepted but followed, at first instance, for some seven years."

The position in Queensland appears to follow the earlier, more permissive approach.

What constitutes a sufficient "other arrangement"?

Even if an "other arrangement" need not be a legally enforceable contract, there are still requirements as to what will constitute a sufficient arrangement for the purposes of the BIF Act.

In GCB Constructions Pty Ltd v SEQ Formwork Pty Ltd [2023] QSC 71, Burns J comprehensively addressed this issue. His Honour stated at [18]:

"...it is important to appreciate that to qualify as an 'other arrangement' for the purposes of the legislation, there must at least be a 'concluded state of affairs, which is bilateral'. There must also be a sufficient degree of mutuality to serve the purposes for which the arrangement is required under the Act including, of particular resonance in this case, enough settled detail to enable the work and/or materials to be claimed with precision and then valued to the same standard."

In that case, the adjudicator had found that a "construction contract" arose from a March 2021 conversation between the parties about preliminary works, which was then "expanded over time". The adjudicator also stated he would have found an "other arrangement" because "a request for work was made, pricing and payment contemplated, and the work was performed". Burns J held this was insufficient. His Honour found at [23]-[25] that the evidence did not establish a sufficient arrangement because:

  • The payment claim was primarily for the supply of material, but there was nothing in the March 2021 conversation regarding the supply of, or payment for, material. The claim for materials was "only unilateral".
  • There was no specification of the rates to be charged for labour.
  • Nothing was agreed about the time for performance of any of the work, the making of claims, the time for payment, retention money, or the transfer of ownership of materials.

His Honour concluded at [25]:

"...the evidence before the adjudicator did not rise any higher than establishing that GCB requested SEQ to provide labour for capping beam works and that SEQ agreed to do that without, at the same time, agreeing the hourly or daily rates that would be charged for that work.

It follows that an agreement of the kind found by the adjudicator could not in my opinion amount to a 'construction contract' within the meaning of the Act and so, without more, it cannot be said that the adjudicator's jurisdiction was enlivened."

The practical effect of GCB Constructions is that an "other arrangement" must have sufficient detail and mutuality to allow for the making and valuation of payment claims under the Act. A mere request to do work, followed by performance, will not be enough if key terms (such as pricing, scope, or timing) remain unresolved.

Between the correct parties

For a valid construction contract to exist for the purposes of the BIF Act, the payment claim must be served by a party to the construction contract on another party to that contract. Issues can arise where the wrong entity is named, or where there is confusion about corporate structures.

In Ratcliffe v Horizon Glass & Aluminium Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 196, Rees J set aside an adjudication determination because there was no construction contract between the claimant and the respondent. The claimant had incorrectly named the individual director of the principal as the respondent to the payment claim, when the construction contract was in fact with the principal company (not the individual director).

Rees J referred at [37] to the summary by Brereton JA in Mills v Walsh [2022] NSWCA 255 at [73] on how the court should determine the parties to a construction contract:

"The parties to a contract are identified according to the objective theory of contract, which involves ascertaining the intention of the parties from their communications and the circumstances in their mutual knowledge, including their evident commercial aims and expectations; their subjective beliefs and intentions are irrelevant, save insofar as they are manifest and shared. However, the post-contractual conduct of the parties may more readily be resorted to for this purpose than for the purpose of construing contractual terms."

Applying this test, Rees J held at [39]-[40] that on the balance of probabilities, the parties had intended that the principal company (and not the individual director) enter the construction contract with the claimant. Therefore, the adjudication determination was set aside as a construction contract did not exist between the claimant and the named respondent.

A similar issue arose in Justar Property Group Pty Ltd v Chase Building Group (Canberra) Pty Ltd [2020] ACTSC 231. In that case, the respondent contended it had never entered into a construction contract with the claimant, but rather that the contract was with a different company (Maxon Group Pty Ltd) which the respondent was associated with. Mossop J held at [52] that the adjudicator was entitled to accept there was some "other arrangement" between the claimant and respondent, and applied Machkevitch, stating:

"...when determining whether or not there is an 'arrangement' which is sufficient to constitute a construction contract under the SOP Act, the court must look for 'a concluded state of affairs, which is bilateral at least, which can amount to an arrangement under which one party to it undertakes to perform construction work for another party to it'."

Construction work

For there to be a construction contract, one party must undertake to "carry out construction work" or "supply related goods and services" to another party. Section 65 of the BIF Act provides an exhaustive definition of "construction work".

Section 65(1) of the BIF Act relevantly provides:

Section 65(1) BIF Act – Meaning of construction work
65 Meaning of construction work

(1)  Construction work means any of the following work—

(a)  the construction, alteration, repair, restoration, maintenance, extension, demolition or dismantling of buildings or structures, whether permanent or not, forming, or to form, part of land;

(b)  the construction, alteration, repair, restoration, maintenance, extension, demolition or dismantling of any works forming, or to form, part of land, including walls, roadworks, powerlines, telecommunication apparatus, aircraft runways, docks and harbours, railways, inland waterways, pipelines, reservoirs, water mains, wells, sewers, industrial plant and installations for land drainage or coast protection;

(c)  the installation in any building, structure or works of fittings forming, or to form, part of land, including heating, lighting, air-conditioning, ventilation, power supply, drainage, sanitation, water supply, fire protection, security and communications systems;

(d)  the external or internal cleaning of buildings, structures and works, so far as it is carried out in the course of their construction, alteration, repair, restoration, maintenance or extension;

(e)  any operation that forms an integral part of, or is preparatory to or is for completing, work of the kind referred to in paragraph (a), (b) or (c), including—

(i)  site clearance, earthmoving, excavation, tunnelling and boring; and

(ii)  the laying of foundations; and

(iii)  the erection, maintenance or dismantling of scaffolding; and

(iv)  the prefabrication of components to form part of any building, structure or works, whether carried out on-site or off-site; and

(v)  site restoration, landscaping and the provision of roadways and other access works...

Section 65(2) provides:

Section 65(2) BIF Act

(2)  To remove doubt, it is declared that construction work includes building work within the meaning of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991.

Section 65(3) excludes certain work from the definition:

Section 65(3) BIF Act – Mining exception

(3)  However, construction work does not include any of the following work—

(a)  the drilling for, or extraction of, oil or natural gas;

(b)  the extraction, whether by underground or surface working, of minerals, including tunnelling or boring, or constructing underground works, for that purpose.

The exclusion in section 65(3)(b) is sometimes referred to as the "mining exception". In Cadia Holdings Pty Ltd v Downer EDI Mining Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 1588, Stevenson J held that preparatory work that is not for the actual purpose of extracting minerals falls within the meaning of construction work and is not excluded by the mining exception in the NSW Act (equivalent to section 65(3)(b) of the BIF Act). His Honour stated that the mining exception was to be construed narrowly to benefit the claimant, meaning the tunnelling, boring, or construction of underground works referred to in the exception must be for the actual purpose of extracting minerals. Where the object and purpose of a contract is not to cause the contractor to undertake work for the purpose of actually extracting minerals, the mining exception will not apply.

In BCS Infrastructure Support Pty Ltd v Jones Lang Lasalle (NSW) Pty Ltd [2020] VSC 739, Stynes J found that the maintenance of baggage conveyor systems, aerobridges, check-in kiosks and baggage return carousels fell within the meaning of construction work under the NSW Act (equivalent to section 65(1)(b) of the BIF Act) on the basis that the significant structures were permanently attached to the terminal building.

Related goods and services

Section 66 of the BIF Act defines "related goods and services" in relation to construction work:

Section 66 BIF Act – Meaning of related goods and services
66 Meaning of related goods and services

(1)  Related goods and services, in relation to construction work, means any of the following—

(a)  goods of the following kind—

(i)  materials and components to form part of any building, structure or work arising from construction work;

(ii)  plant or materials (whether supplied by sale, hire or otherwise) for use in connection with the carrying out of construction work;

(b)  services of the following kind—

(i)  the provision of labour to carry out construction work;

(ii)  architectural, design, surveying or quantity surveying services relating to construction work;

(iii)  building, engineering, interior or exterior decoration or landscape advisory services relating to construction work;

(iv)  soil testing services relating to construction work;

(c)  goods and services, relating to construction work, of a kind prescribed by regulation.

The definition of related goods and services is tied to construction work. If the underlying work is not construction work within section 65, then goods and services supplied in connection with that work will not be "related goods and services" and there will be no construction contract.

What is a "progress payment"?

The BIF Act scheme depends on the existence of an entitlement to a "progress payment". Section 64 defines "progress payment":

Section 64 BIF Act – Progress payment definition

progress payment means a payment to which a person is entitled under section 70, and includes, without affecting any entitlement under the section—

(a)  the final payment for construction work carried out, or for related goods and services supplied, under a construction contract; or

(b)  a single or one-off payment for carrying out construction work, or for supplying related goods and services, under a construction contract; or

(c)  a payment that is based on an event or date, known in the building and construction industry as a 'milestone payment'.

In EnerMech Pty Ltd v Acciona Infrastructure Projects Australia Pty Ltd [2024] NSWCA 162, Basten AJA (with whom Meagher JA and Griffiths AJA agreed) considered the definitions of "construction contract" and "progress payment" in the NSW Act. His Honour stated at [16]:

"Two points are immediately apparent from these provisions: first, the Security of Payment Act does not purport to limit the amount or nature of a payment to which a party is entitled under a construction contract; secondly, there is a risk in compartmentalising payments according to their character, regardless of the terms of the contract, so as to contend that some fall within the concept of a progress payment for which a claim may be made, and some do not."

Practice tips

  • Before serving a payment claim, verify there is a valid construction contract (or sufficient "other arrangement") between the parties who are named as claimant and respondent.
  • If relying on an informal arrangement (not a written contract), ensure there is sufficient detail about key terms: what work is to be done, the price or rate, timing, and payment terms. A mere request to do work followed by performance will likely be insufficient.
  • Check the correct legal entities are parties to the arrangement. Use the objective theory of contract to identify the parties from their communications and conduct.
  • Ensure the work claimed is "construction work" within section 65 or relates to "related goods and services" within section 66. If in doubt, check whether the work falls within any of the express exclusions in section 65(3).
  • If the work involves mining or extraction activities, consider carefully whether the mining exception in section 65(3)(b) applies. The exception is to be construed narrowly and only applies to work for the actual purpose of extracting minerals.

Identify the construction works

Pursuant to section 68(1)(a) of the BIF Act, a payment claim must identify the construction work or related goods and services to which it relates.

Section 68(1)(a) BIF Act – Meaning of payment claim
68 Meaning of payment claim

(1)  A payment claim, for a progress payment, is a written document that—

(a)  identifies the construction work or related goods and services to which the progress payment relates; and

General principles

The test is not whether the claim explains every calculation, but whether the relevant construction work (and/or related goods and services) is sufficiently identified such that the basis of the claim is reasonably comprehensible to the recipient. In MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94, Dalton JA (Brown and Kelly JJ agreeing) said (adopting T & M Buckley Pty Ltd v 57 Moss Road Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 381):

[24] In determining whether or not a document identifies the work, goods and services to which the claim relates, the Courts take a practical, and not overly technical, attitude. In T & M Buckley Pty Ltd v 57 Moss Road Pty Ltd Philippides J, writing in this Court, said that the issue for determination was, "… not whether the payment claim explained in every respect the means by which a particular claim item had been calculated, but whether the relevant construction work or related goods and services was sufficiently identified … That is, whether the payment claim reasonably identified the construction work to which it related such that the basis of the claim was reasonably comprehensible to the applicant." It has been accepted by the Courts that, in deciding whether or not work has been sufficiently identified, the background of each of the parties "derived from their past dealings and exchanges of documentation" is to be taken into account.

In ascertaining whether the identification of construction work is reasonably comprehensible to the recipient, the following matters are usually relevant (among others, discussed below):

  • The fact that payment claims are often "given and received by people experience in the building industry" and that the level of description might reflect that. Vanbeelen v Blackbird Energy Pty Ltd [2006] QDC 285, [37] (Brabazon KC DCJ) citing McDougall J in Isis Projects v Clarence Street [2004] NSWSC 714, [36]–[38].
  • The parties' background knowledge. "It is appropriate to take into account the background knowledge of the parties derived from their past dealings and exchanges of information". Mackie Pty Ltd v Counahan [2013] VSC 694, [46] (Vickery J); Neumann Contractors Pty Ltd v Peet Beachton Syndicate Ltd [2011] 1 Qd R 17, [25].
  • If the payment claim is claiming for items that are mentioned in the construction contract, their identity may be able to be ascertained by reference to the contract. See the observations of McDougall J in Multiplex Construction Pty Ltd v Luikens [2003] NSWSC 1140, [37] approved in Clarence Street Pty Ltd v Isis Projects Pty Ltd (2005) 64 NSWLR 448, 455-6; [2005] NSWCA 391, [33] cited in KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178, [58] (Brown J):

[37] In principle, I think, the requirement in s 13(2)(a) that a payment claim must identify the construction work to which the progress payment relates is capable of being satisfied where:

(1) The payment claim gives an item reference which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be taken as referring to the contractual or other identification of the work;

(2) That reference is supplemented by a single line item description of the work;

(3) Particulars are given of the amount previously completed and claimed and the amount now said to be complete;

(4) There is a summary that pulls all the details together and states the amount claimed.

Degree of particularity in identifying construction works

The construction work (or related goods and services) must be identified with some degree of particularity. That is, the specific work the subject of the claim should be identified, rather than simply the general work that is the subject of the construction contract as a whole: Jemzone Pty Ltd v Trytan Pty Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 42; [2002] NSWSC 395, [43].

The respondent should be capable of determining whether or not to pay the claim. "There must be sufficient specificity in the payment claim for its recipient actually to be able to identify a payment claim for the purpose of determining whether to pay": Nepean Engineering Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] NSWCA 409, [47]–[48] (Santow JA); see also Protectavale Pty Ltd v K2K Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1248, [12] (Finkelstein J) cited in KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178, [52] (Brown J); see alike observations in Richard Kirk Architect Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2012] QSC 117, [29] (Daubney J).

However, determining whether the construction work has been sufficiently "identified" should not be approached in an unduly technical manner: Hawkins Construction (Aust) Pty Ltd v Macs Industrial Pipework Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 136, [20] (Davies AJA).

If the payment claim merely consists of a few failures to identify construction work, but by and large the work is properly identified, the payment claim may not necessarily be invalid: Nepean Engineering Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] NSWCA 409, [37] (Santow J).

Factual and mathematical errors

Generally, whether the works have been sufficiently "identified" for the purpose of section 68(1)(a) is not to be assessed by reference to whether the payment claim is factually correct or has been calculated strictly in accordance with the contract: Denbrook Constructions Pty Ltd v CBO Developments Pty Ltd [2022] QDC 184, [66] (Porter KC DCJ).

Additionally, if the payment claim has some mathematical errors, that will not of itself invalidate the payment claim, unless the errors are of a nature which renders or contributes to the payment claim being incomprehensible. KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178, [43] (Brown J).

History of paying similar payment claims may be indicative of sufficient identification

In Isis Projects Pty Ltd v Clarence Street Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 714, Clarence Street (Developer) and Isis Projects (Builder) enter into a construction contract to refurbish and fit out a building at 50 Clarence Street, Sydney NSW 2000. The Developer failed to pay in full, or serve payment schedules in response to, payment claims 12 and 13 (PC12 and PC13), which consisted of a cover sheet and a tax invoice describing the work by one line items, and showing for each the original contract value, the amount of previous claims, the value of work to date and the percentage completed. The Developer contended PC12 and PC13 were not valid. The Builder contended the PCs were valid and the Developer's failure to issue payment schedules meant the PCs were payable in full. The Court held that the previous conduct of the Developer in having paid 11 previous payment claims of a similar nature showed that the Developer was capable of finding meaning in the Builder's identification of the works. Thus, that conduct supported the conclusion that PC12 and PC13 sufficiently identified the construction work to which their respective payment claims relate. See the findings of McDougal J at [38]:

[38] Where payment claims in that format have been used, apparently without objection, on 11 previous occasions, it is very difficult to understand how the use of the same format on the 12th and 13th occasions could be said not to comply with the requirements of s 13(2)(a). If payments claims in that format had sufficiently identified the construction work to which the progress payment claimed related on 11 previous occasions, I find it hard to understand how they would lose that character on the 12th and 13th occasion.

Case examples of what is not sufficient

MWB Everton Park

Percentages against broad trade headings without tethering to identifiable scopes/locations/activities will usually fail. In MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94, the Court held a trade-summary/percentage approach did not identify the work for a 56-townhouse project:

[25] …The contract was for the construction of 56 townhouses. In those circumstances, it was all but meaningless to say that 5% of concreting or 12% of plumbing had been completed. More description was needed if the document was to sufficiently identify the construction work, related goods and services, for the purpose of s 68(1)(a).

That approach reflects Brown J's analysis in KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178, where a one-page "trade breakdown" with only categories and percentages – no particulars of the actual work – failed the identification limb:

[64] … Whatever form of claim a claimant chooses to adopt, it must identify in a reasonable way the construction work to which the claim relates. While the purpose of the scheme is to permit the quick resolution of payment claims, the claimant must at least be reasonably comprehensible, to permit the respondent to respond within the time frame provided under the Act. The payment claim in this case has failed to do so.

KDV Sport

The judgment in KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178 helpfully provides an excerpt of the payment claim which, in that case, was found not to have identified the construction work to which it related:

[35] … The payment claim submitted by Muggeridge consisted of a one page document.[25] It contained 6 columns. The first was headed "trade breakdown", the second "Total Amount", the third "Total Paid to Date", the fourth "Total Claim % to Date", the fifth "Total Claimed Trade to Date" and the sixth "Progress Claim". An extract of the payment claim submitted, highlighting particular items which have been the subject of submissions, is as follows:

WUC– Site Project Student Accommodation Big 18 Chisholm Road Carrara QLD
Prior Payment Total Claim to Date This Claim
Trade Breakdown Total Amount Total Paid to Date Total claim % to date Total Claimed Trade to date Progress Claim 13
8 CONCRETE SUPPLY $229,454 $217,981 100% $229,454 $4,589
19 ALUMINIUM WINDOWS & DOORS $811,840 $32,474 67% $543,933 $97,421
23 BATHROOM POD – COMPLETE SUPPLY AND INSTALL $659,231 $560,346 98% $646,046 $52,738
39 ELECTRICAL $783,827 $470,296 78% $611,385 $101,898
40 MECHANICAL $920,220 $690,165 82% $754,580 $36,809
49 BUILDERS PRELIMIINARIES $820,407 $672,734 100% $820,407 $123,061
Contract Works Subtotal excl GST $817,586
GST $81,759
Contract Works Subtotal incl GST $899,345
Variations
Submitted Claim Prior Payment Total Claim To Date This Claim
Total Paid to Date $ Total claim % to date Total Claimed Trade to date Progress Claim 13
Variation #1 VO 003 $1,925 $ - 100% $1,925 $ -
Variation #5 VO 008 $54,075 $15,373 100% $54,075 $38,702
Variation #12 VO 016 – Fire rating upgrade $10,095 $ - 100% $10,095 $10,095
Variation #13 VO 017 – Structural design JN designers $726 $ - 100% $726 $726
Variation 029 $21,606 $ - 100% $21,606 $21,606
Variation 030 $9,507 $ - 100% $9,507 $9,507
Variation 031 $82,806 $ - 100% $82,806 $82,806
Contract Works Subtotal excl GST $1,466,087
GST $146,609
Contract Works Subtotal incl GST $1,612,696
Total Progress Claim $2,283,673
GST $81,759
Total Value of Claim #12 $2,365,432

Specifically, at [37] – [38] of KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178, Brown J gave examples of line items which were inadequately described:

  • "Aluminium Windows & Doors";
  • "Electrical";
  • "Builder's Preliminaries";
  • "Concrete Supply";
  • "Mechanical".

Her Honour found at [60] that these items were distinguishable from the following line items which were adequately described in Peter's of Kensington v Seersucker Pty Ltd [2008] NSWSC 897, [44]–[75] (McDougall J):

  • Stage (Warehouse/Retail/Office) Design Development;
  • Stage (Warehouse/Retail/Office) Contract Documents;
  • Stage 2 (Carpark) Design Development;
  • Stage 2 (Carpark) Contract Documents Development.

Adjudication examples

MSS Projects (NSW) Pty Ltd v CPB BAM Ghella UGL JV (Adj No 2658135) – The document had clear front-matter and a contract summary, then line-item tables under specific categories showing unit, quantity, rate, completed-to-date and completed-this-period, with brief variation notes and attachments tied to the pricing schedule. Only defined categories were claimed for the period, and the descriptions and figures aligned with Annexure A/H so the respondent could understand and check them. Accordingly, the adjudicator found section 68(1)(a) was satisfied.

Verus Construction Pty Ltd v Tripple J. T Pty Ltd (Adj No 925538) – The adjudicator found the claim failed to satisfy section 68(1)(a) because the monthly "work done" descriptions were broad labels with no particulars, so the basis of the claim was not reasonably comprehensible. He noted the EOT component was shown only by three red lines on a one-page program and a separate daily rate sheet, which did not give sufficient particulars of either the EOTs or the resulting delay costs. The variations were described over one or two pages but then referred to other invoices and documents that were not included with the claim, so the supporting detail was missing. Accordingly, the adjudicator found he did not have jurisdiction.

YFA Pty Ltd v Advanced Buildings (Queensland) Pty Ltd (Adj No 1067253) – The "payment claim" was essentially a tax invoice (INV-2313, 31 March 2021) tied to a purchase order, with no particulars of what work was done, where, or when (no measurements, locations, period, drawings or calculations). The document did not "clearly, reasonably and adequately" identify the construction work to which it related. On that basis and for other reasons, the adjudicator found he did not have jurisdiction.

Practice tips

  • Use location + scope + activity + period for every line (e.g., "Tower 1, L10–L12: install grid & tile to corridors – 1 January 2025 to 10 January 2025").
  • Anchor to the contract: cite the contract/Annexure item ID, unit, quantity, rate, previously approved and this period columns.
  • Avoid percentages against broad trades ("Electrical 15%"); make it findable on site with concrete descriptors.
  • Keep all supporting documents with the claim (drawings/marked-ups, delivery dockets, photos) and ensure the text of the claim itself makes sense without hunting prior claims.
  • For supply-only items, specify units/tonnage/quantities, delivery dates/locations, and what remains to supply (if any).
  • Variations, delay costs claims, etc. should ideally be communicated by project letter to the respondent first, and then that correspondence should be referred (and attached) to the payment claim.

State the claimed amount

Pursuant to section 68(1)(b) of the BIF Act, a payment claim must state the amount of the progress payment (i.e. the claimed amount) that the claimant claims is payable by the respondent.

Section 68(1)(b) BIF Act – Meaning of payment claim
68 Meaning of payment claim

(1)  A payment claim, for a progress payment, is a written document that—

(b)  states the amount (the claimed amount) of the progress payment that the claimant claims is payable by the respondent; and

Must state a claimed amount

To avoid ambiguity, a payment claim should clearly identify a single, specific figure as the "claimed amount". Failing to state the claimed amount may invalidate the payment claim, even if the total amount of the payment claim is ascertainable by summing individual items claimed.

Avoid stating multiple figures that could be construed as the claimed amount

Similarly, a payment claim should avoid presenting multiple figures that could each be read as the "claimed amount". In MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94, the Queensland Court of Appeal found that an email and multiple spreadsheets did not state a single claimed amount. The spreadsheets showed different "due this claim" totals for separable parts of the works, and the project summary failed to state the total cumulative claim. Because there was no clearly identified, single claimed amount, the package of documents did not constitute a valid payment claim under the BIF Act (at [27]–[33]).

Having said this, there is authority under the predecessor Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2004 (Qld) suggesting that it is sufficient for a payment claim to state multiple amounts which collectively constitute the claimed amount. See the observations of Henry J in Camporeale Holdings Pty Ltd v Mortimer Construction Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 211, especially at [32]:

[32] The applicant submitted the covering email here should have cited a single total amount claimed. However, it is obvious when the documents are considered together that the amount claimed was the total of the four amounts stated in the invoices. The absence of a statement of the mathematical total of those amounts does not make the statements of the four amounts considered in combination any less a statement of the amount of the progress payment claimed. I am fortified in reaching that conclusion by s 32C of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) which provides that in an act words in the singular include the plural and vice versa. Thus a payment claim which states the amounts of the progress payment claimed to be payable will comply with s 17(2)(b), as long as those amounts are stated as part of one payment claim.

Where applicable, the claimed amount should be GST inclusive

To the extent GST applies, best practice is to express the claimed amount as the GST inclusive figure. While the issue has not been tested before a court, expressing a claimed amount as GST exclusive may expose the payment claim to an argument that the GST component is not part of the payment claim.

Request payment

Pursuant to section 68(1)(c) of the BIF Act, a payment claim must request payment of the claimed amount.

Section 68(1)(c) BIF Act – Meaning of payment claim
68 Meaning of payment claim

(1)  A payment claim, for a progress payment, is a written document that—

(c)  requests payment of the claimed amount.

History

The requirement to request payment of the claimed amount was introduced under the BIF Act in lieu of the former requirement under the Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2004 (Qld) to state that the payment claim was made under the Act. Most jurisdictions other than Queensland (e.g. New South Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia, Tasmania, Australian Capital Territory) still require an express endorsement under their respective security of payment acts.

"Invoice" is sufficient

For the purpose of satisfying section 68(1)(c) of the BIF Act, it is sufficient to include the word "invoice" on the face of the payment claim (section 68(3) of the BIF Act). It would appear that the payment claim does not have to, in fact, be a legitimate tax invoice; however, if the claimant intends to rely on including the word "invoice" for the purpose of requesting payment, best practice would be to ensure the payment claim satisfies the requirements of a valid tax invoice under section 29.70 of the A New Tax System (Goods and Services Tax) Act 1999 (Cth).

"Amount due this claim" is not sufficient

In MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94, the Queensland Court of Appeal held that the words "amount due this claim" was not sufficient to request payment. At [35], Dalton JA (Brown and Kelly JJ agreeing) stated:

[35] The respondent's argument that the words "amount due this claim" were a request for payment must be rejected. The statement of the "amount due this claim" was an identification by the builder of the progress payment which it claimed was payable by the principal. That identification was required by s 68(1)(b). Something more was required by s 68(1)(c); there had to be a request for payment of the amount claimed….

Request for payment must be express or necessarily and clearly implied

In the same decision (MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94), the Queensland Court of Appeal also held that for something to amount to a "request" for payment, it must be either expressly stated in the payment claim, or necessarily and clearly implied:

[35] …It might be accepted that no particular form of words is necessary. However, something which amounts to a request for payment needs either to be express in the document or necessarily, and clearly, implied in the document. Here, I cannot see that there was anything in the email and attachments of 30 June 2023 which requested payment.

Endorsement under the BIF Act might not be sufficient

As mentioned above, section 68(1)(c) of the BIF Act was introduced to replace the previous requirement to expressly state that the payment claim was made under the Building and Construction Industry Payments Act 2004 (Qld). In practice, many Queensland payment claims still contain an endorsement under the legislation.

In Iris Broadbeach Business Pty Ltd v Descon Group Australia Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 16, the Supreme Court of Queensland found that a document that:

  • was titled "Victoria and Albert Broadbeach Progress Claim";
  • included words such as "Total progress claim value";
  • was endorsed under the BIF Act, having stated "This Progress Claim is submitted under the Building Industry Fairness (Security of Payment) Act 2017"; and
  • was accompanied by a statutory declaration in relation to the payment of "Progress Claim No 7",

amounted to an implied request for payment (see [139] to [142]).

However, the Queensland Court of Appeal in MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94 casted doubt over whether those four factors were indeed sufficient to "request payment of the claimed amount" under section 68(1)(c). At [36], Dalton JA (Brown and Kelly JJ agreeing) stated (possibly in obiter, though the reasons do appear to have informed the Court's ultimate decision):

[36] The respondent referred us to Iris Broadbeach Business Pty Ltd v Descon Group Australia Pty Ltd. In that case a document which was not an invoice was found to be a payment claim, even though it did not expressly request payment of the identified amount. The single judge in that case identified that s 68(1)(b) and s 68(1)(c) of the BIFA imposed independent requirements, both of which had to be met, and that the section had to be read to give s 68(1)(c) "work to do" — [132]. In that case the judge was prepared to find that the documentation impliedly included a request for payment because the document was headed "Progress Claim"; gave a figure for a "Total Progress Claim Value for the Month (Incl GST)"; was annotated to the effect that "This Progress Claim is submitted under the Building Industry Fairness (Security of Payment) Act 2017 …", and was accompanied by a statutory declaration which, like the declaration here, recited that the statutory declaration was made "in connection with the payment of Progress Claim No …". While I cannot see any relevant distinction between the documents in this case and the documents in Iris Broadbeach Business, I am afraid that I am not persuaded by the analysis in that case. I do not think it can be said that the documents comprising the email and attachments of 30 June 2023 made a request for payment, independently of identifying the amount the subject of the claim.

Based on MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94, it would appear that stating a payment claim is made under the BIF Act is not, by itself, sufficient to meet the requirement of section 68(1)(c).

That said, the District Court of Queensland in Starline Interiors Pty Ltd v Tomkins Commercial and Industrial Builders Pty Ltd [2025] QDC 63 (at [22]–[34]) held a document that included the words "payment claim" and stated "This is a payment claim made under the Building Industry Fairness (Security of Payment) Act 2017" was valid. Kent KC DCJ distinguished Dalton JA's findings in MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94 on the basis that, among other things, the documents in Iris Broadbeach Business Pty Ltd v Descon Group Australia Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 16 that her Honour appeared to opine were not sufficient to request payment under section 68(1)(c) contained the words "progress claim" rather than "payment claim". There were other reasons supporting the validity of the payment claim in this case, including that the document included the words "net payment claimed", where the past participle "claimed" implies a request for payment.

Adjudication examples

Elite Earthmoving & Civil Pty Ltd v QLD Built Pty Ltd (Adj No 2881547) – The phrase "Contract Inv" on the document was held insufficient to satisfy section 68(1)(c). The adjudicator reasoned that section 68(3) deems a document bearing the word "invoice" to request payment; shorthand ("Inv") isn't within the text of the statute. Accordingly, the adjudicator found she had no jurisdiction.

J Hutchinson Pty Ltd v Eve Co Aust Pty Ltd (Adj No 2794290) – Although the document did not appear to be a formal tax invoice, and the word "invoice" was not prominent on the face of the document, the adjudicator held that mere inclusion of the word "invoice" anywhere in the written document is enough under section 68(3) to satisfy section 68(1)(c).

Croudace Greenhouses International Pty Ltd v Hansen Yuncken Pty Limited (Adj No 2756369) – The payment claim did not request payment of the claimed amount and did not bear the word "invoice". Applying MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94, the adjudicator found that headings and statements such as "Progress Claim is made for payment…", references to a "Total" figure, BIF Act endorsement, and a statutory declaration did not independently amount to a request for payment under section 68(1)(c). Accordingly, the adjudicator found he had no jurisdiction.

Melrose Built Pty Ltd v 114 Edward Pty Ltd (Adj No 2588358) – The adjudicator held that the narration "TOTAL PAYABLE (Excluding GST)" in the progress claim satisfied (expressly or clearly implied) the section 68(1)(c) request requirement, including because the words "total payable" (having regard to the ordinary meaning of "payable") go further than "amount due" and amount to an implied request for payment.

Practice tips

  • Include the word "invoice" or a phrase to the effect of "this is a request for payment under the Building Industry Fairness (Security of Payment) Act 2017 (Qld)" (or both).
  • If relying only on the word "invoice", while it is probably not strictly necessary for the payment claim to be a valid tax invoice, best practice may be to ensure the document complies with the formal requirements of a tax invoice (e.g. state the claimant's name and ABN, identify which supplies are taxable supplies and the relevant amounts of GST payable, include a date of issue, etc.).

Claim for a valid reference date

Pursuant to section 70 of the BIF Act, a person who has carried out construction work, or supplied related goods and services, under a construction contract is entitled to a progress payment from each reference date.

Section 70 BIF Act – Entitlement to progress payment
70 Entitlement to progress payment

(1)  A person who has carried out construction work, or supplied related goods and services, under a construction contract is entitled to receive a progress payment from each reference date under the contract.

A "reference date" is defined under section 67 of the BIF Act.

Section 67 BIF Act – Meaning of reference date
67 Meaning of reference date

(1)  A reference date, for a construction contract, means—

(a)  a date stated in, or worked out under, the contract as the date on which a claim for a progress payment may be made for construction work carried out, or related goods and services supplied, under the contract; or

(b)  if the contract does not provide for the matter—

(i)  the last day of the month in which the construction work was first carried out, or the related goods and services were first supplied, under the contract; and

(ii)  the last day of each later month.

(2)  However, if a construction contract is terminated and the contract does not provide for, or purports to prevent, a reference date surviving beyond termination, the final reference date for the contract is the date the contract is terminated.

Jurisdictional requirement

A payment claim will be invalid if it is not made from a valid reference date. As the High Court unanimously found in Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lewence Construction Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 340 (Southern Han):

[61] The construction of s 13(1) consonant with the structure of the Act is accordingly that advanced by Southern Han. The description in s 13(1) of a person referred to in s 8(1) is of a person whom s 8(1) makes entitled to a progress payment. Section 8(1) makes a person who has undertaken to carry out construction work or supply related goods and services under a construction contract entitled to a progress payment only on and from each reference date under the construction contract. In that way, the existence of a reference date under a construction contract within the meaning of s 8(1) is a precondition to the making of a valid payment claim under s 13(1).

The decision in Southern Han was dealing with reference dates under analogous provisions of the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 1999 (NSW); however, the decision has been followed in Queensland. See for example the following passage of Wilson J in National Management Group Pty Ltd v Biriel Industries Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 219:

[47] In Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lewence Construction Pty Ltd (Southern Han Breakfast), the High Court confirmed that where one payment claim has already been made in relation to a particular reference date, any later payment claim purportedly made in respect of the same reference date is not valid. The High Court also stated that a valid payment claim is a necessary prerequisite to an adjudication application.

See also Karam Group Pty Ltd v Earthmoving Contractors Pty Ltd [2021] QSC 10:

[17] …It is uncontroversial that the existence of a valid reference date is a jurisdictional fact…

Thus, if a payment claim is made without the accrual of a valid reference date, then it is invalid and cannot be adjudicated upon.

From each reference date

In past, there have been competing Queensland views as to whether a payment claim must be made "on" the reference date or may be made "after" (but in respect of) that date. In Reed Constructions (Qld) Pty Ltd v Martinek Holdings Pty Ltd [2011] 1 Qd R 28; [2009] QSC 345, Daubney J read the entitlement as confined to making a claim on the date specified, recognising only a single opportunity per month, with any missed month postponed to the next (at [26]). By contrast, in Tenix Alliance Pty Ltd v Magaldi Power Pty Ltd [2010] QSC 7, Fryberg J declined to follow Reed, holding that the Act does not forbid making one claim after the relevant date in respect of that date; the prohibition is only against two claims for the one reference date (at [45]–[46]). The later approach was adopted by Mullins J in McNab Developments (Qld) Pty Ltd v MAK Construction Services Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 293: the statutory right "from each reference date" permits a claim at any time after the contractual date, subject to the statutory outer limit. Under the BIF Act, the correct approach almost certainly is that a payment claim can be served both on and from/after the reference date.

Cannot claim twice for the same reference date

Pursuant to section 75(4) of the BIF Act, a claimant cannot make more than one payment claim for each reference date:

Section 75(4) BIF Act – Making payment claim
75 Making payment claim

(4)  A claimant can make no more than 1 payment claim for each reference date under the construction contract.

If a payment claim is made in respect of a reference date already relied upon for a previous valid payment claim, then it will be invalid: National Management Group Pty Ltd v Biriel Industries Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 219, [44]–[69] (Wilson J).

Payment claim should not claim for work performed after reference date

There is a line of authority in Queensland which suggests that a payment claim will be invalid if it claims for work performed after the reference date. See for example:

  • the following passage in Karam Group Pty Ltd v Earthmoving Contractors Pty Ltd [2021] QSC 10 (Karam) which states that a payment claim that includes work beyond the reference date is invalid:

[16] It is correct, as the First Respondent submitted, that s 68 of the BIFA does not require the payment claim to specify the reference date, even though it is a statutory condition that there be a reference date for a party to be entitled to a progress claim, and therefore for the making of a payment claim. There is authority supporting the fact that a payment claim which includes work beyond the reference date is not a valid payment claim.

  • the decision in Watkins Contracting Pty Ltd v Hyatt Ground Engineering Pty Ltd [2018] QSC 065 (Watkins) where the Supreme Court of Queensland held that two purported payment claims which included work carried out after the reference date were not valid:

[103] The fact that Watkins had treated the claims of 10 November 2016 and 24 November 2016 as payment claims, notwithstanding they were incorrectly endorsed, does not make them valid payment claims. It is clear on the face of the payment claims of 10 November 2016 and 24 November 2016 that they included work carried out beyond 31 October 2016. As they included work carried out after 31 October 2016 [the reference date] they were not valid payment claims and therefore did not extinguish the reference date of 31 October 2016…

Progress payment to be assessed as at reference date

The reference date is the point in time at which a payment claim is to be assessed. That is, for the purpose of valuing a payment claim, the parties' rights and obligations should be determined as at the reference date. Events which post-date the reference date – even if they pre-date the adjudication application (if any) – are not strictly relevant to the valuation of the payment claim: Chevron Park Pty Ltd v Groupline Constructions Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 202; Bright Days Herston Pty Ltd v ATG Project & Property Solutions Pty Ltd [2025] QSC 147 (c.f. the Western Australian approach: Duro Felguera Australia Pty Ltd v Samsung C&T Corp (2018) 52 WAR 323).

Contractual preconditions to the accrual of a reference date

Generally, a contractual provision that purports to set preconditions to the accrual of a reference date (or when the claimant is entitled to make a progress payment) will be void for the purposes of the BIF Act.

In Lean Field Developments Pty Ltd v E & I Global Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd [2016] 1 Qd R 30, Applegarth J held at [55]:

[55] A provision which inordinately delays or effectively prevents a reference date from arising would be contrary to the Act's objective of conferring a statutory entitlement to a progress payment from a reference date. That purpose is protected by s 99 of the Act. A provision which unjustifiably prevents or inordinately delays a reference date from arising is invalidated by s 99 because it is contrary to the Act. Such a provision unjustifiably changes the effect of the Act in granting a statutory entitlement to a progress payment. The contractual provision is void to that extent, but is not void to the extent that it governs a co-existing contractual entitlement.

Applegarth J made similar findings in BRB Modular Pty Ltd v AWX Constructions Pty Ltd [2015] QSC 218, finding that a clause 14.10 of the parties' contract – which required the claimant to deliver a signed statutory declaration at least two days prior to the time for making the payment claim – was not capable of conditioning the accrual of a reference date.

His Honour's decision in Lean Field Developments Pty Ltd v E & I Global Solutions (Aust) Pty Ltd [2016] 1 Qd R 30 was considered and applied by Ball J more recently in East End Projects Pty Ltd v GJ Building and Contracting Pty Ltd [2020] NSWSC 819.

Reference dates following take out

Under many unamended Australian Standard contracts, payment to the claimant is suspended upon the respondent validly taking the work out of its hands. Notwithstanding the authorities about contractual preconditions to reference dates, the position appears to be that reference dates do not arise upon payments being suspended following take out.

In Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lewence Construction Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 340, the High Court held that a contractor did not have a valid reference date because the principal had exercised its right under clause 39.4 of the contract to take the work out of the contractor's hand, and that operated to expressly suspend payment under completion of the process for which clause 39.6 provided. Accordingly, the High Court allowed an appeal quashing a lower court decision that the adjudicator's determination was valid.

A year after Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lewence Construction Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 340, the Supreme Court of Victoria quashed an adjudicator's determination in Westbourne Grammar School v Gemcan Constructions Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 645 on the basis that there was no reference date because the works had been taken out of the contractor's hands. In that case, the principal served a take out notice under clause 39.4 of the contract. The contractor subsequently made a payment claim and was awarded $241,973.33 at adjudication. The principal applied to the Court to have the decision set aside on the grounds the payment claim had no reference date because the works had been taken out of the contractor's hands. The Court applied Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lewence Construction Pty Ltd (2016) 260 CLR 340 and held that the accrual of reference dates was suspended on the principal's exercise of its take out rights under clause 39.4.

Subsequently, in Parrwood Pty Ltd v Trinity Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 172, the New South Wales Court of Appeal applied both Southern Han and Westbourne Grammar School to hold that statutory entitlements no longer arise following valid service of a take out notice:

[30] Southern Han is an authoritative decision on materially identical contractual provisions. It is settled law that after the valid service of a take out notice, the contractor's rights are thereafter suspended, including the right to claim progress payments under cl 37, which in turn has the result that the statutory entitlement under s 8 will thereafter no longer arise. Westbourne Grammar School is to the same effect.

It is important to note that the suspension of payment dates is a function of the fact many Australian Standard contracts defer payment to the claimant until the completion of the works taken out of their hands. If a take out clause does not provide that deferral, then it is possible reference dates may still accrue.

Reference dates following termination

Subsection (2) of section 67 provides that, if a construction contract is terminated and the contract does not provide for, or purports to prevent, a reference date surviving beyond termination, the final reference date for the contract is the date the contract is terminated. For a case example, see SHA Premier Constructions Pty Ltd v Niclin Constructions Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 307 in which Bond J upheld an adjudicator's decision on the basis that, among other things, he had correctly found the claimant had a final reference date arising on the date of termination of the contract.

Practice tips

  • Serve only on or after the reference date, never before.
  • Make one claim per reference date and, if needed, re-include unpaid amounts in a later claim rather than issuing a second claim for the same date.
  • Include only work up to the reference date (always exclude work done later, late variations, or post-date quantities).
  • On termination/take-out, confirm whether reference dates survive; if not, treat the termination date as the final reference date and avoid draft-claim preconditions that condition accrual.

Not be for unlicensed building work

Under section 42 of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld), a person who performs unlicensed building work is not entitled to any monetary or other consideration – including under the BIF Act – for doing so:

Section 42 QBCC Act – Unlawful carrying out of building work
42 Unlawful carrying out of building work

(1)  Unless exempt under schedule 1A, a person must not carry out, or undertake to carry out, building work unless the person holds a contractor's licence of the appropriate class under this Act.

Penalty—

Maximum penalty—

(a)  for a first offence—250 penalty units; or

(b)  for a second offence—300 penalty units; or

(c)  for a third or later offence, or if the building work carried out is tier 1 defective work—350 penalty units or 1 year's imprisonment.

(2)  An individual who contravenes subsection (1) and is liable to a maximum penalty of 350 penalty units or 1 year's imprisonment, commits a crime.

(3)  Subject to subsection (4), a person who carries out building work in contravention of this section is not entitled to any monetary or other consideration for doing so.

(4)  A person is not stopped under subsection (3) from claiming reasonable remuneration for carrying out building work, but only if the amount claimed—

(a)  is not more than the amount paid by the person in supplying materials and labour for carrying out the building work; and

(b)  does not include allowance for any of the following—

(i)  the supply of the person's own labour;

(ii)  the making of a profit by the person for carrying out the building work;

(iii)  costs incurred by the person in supplying materials and labour if, in the circumstances, the costs were not reasonably incurred; and

(c)  is not more than any amount agreed to, or purportedly agreed to, as the price for carrying out the building work; and

(d)  does not include any amount paid by the person that may fairly be characterised as being, in substance, an amount paid for the person's own direct or indirect benefit.

Dart Holdings – Contract cannot be severed

In Dart Holdings Pty Ltd v Total Concept Group Pty Ltd [2012] QSC 158, the respondent applied to set aside an adjudicator's decision on the basis that the claimant was unlicensed to perform the contracted work. The Court held that most items (windows, doors, shopfronts, etc.) fell within the claimant's Carpentry licence, but glass awnings did not, so entering the contract breached the Queensland Building Services Australia Act 1991 (Qld) (now the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld)). Because the contract was lump-sum (meaning it could not be severed to save part of the payment provisions), there was no security of payment entitlement and therefore the adjudicator's decision was void. McMurdo J held at [44]:

[44] The appropriate relief is to make declarations as to the contravention of s 42(1) and its impact upon the Contract and a right to be paid under the Payments Act.

Galaxy Developments

Subsequently, in Galaxy Developments Pty Ltd v Civil Contractors (Aust) Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 51, the claimant (contractor) performed subdivision works and obtained an adjudication, but the respondent (principal) argued the claimant lacked an appropriate licence for minor "bus stop" items. The Court held the claimant's structural landscaping licence covered relocating the prefabricated bus shelter (a "prefabricated shed") but not the freestanding seat and bike rack, which were fixed structures constituting building work. The busway exemption didn't apply; Foxwell Road was a dedicated road (so road works were exempt) but the footpath wasn't part of the "road", so the seat and bike rack remained regulated building work. Because the contract required some unlicensed building work, the claimant had no contractual entitlement to payment and therefore no Payments Act entitlement. Nevertheless, Dalton J acknowledged the absurdity of the result of her Honour's decision at [109]:

[109] Focussing only on the licensing issues raised by this case, my conclusion is a result of stochastic and illogical provisions in the schedules to the QBCC Regulations and produces a result which, although it may be correct in law, is absurd in reality: the first respondent was licensed to demolish, move and reassemble a prefabricated bus shelter, but not licensed to carry out the same actions in relation to the much simpler structures of a freestanding bus seat and bike rack. Again, focussing only on the licensing issues, the result is not that the first respondent cannot be paid for those very small items of work, but that the first respondent cannot be paid for work under a contract worth $1.3 million. I invite the renewed attention of the Legislature to the need for establishing a rational and fair law in relation to recovery of payment under contracts to perform building works.

Galaxy Developments Pty Ltd v Civil Contractors (Aust) Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 51 was appealed unsuccessfully. However, in the appeal judgment (Civil Contractors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Galaxy Developments Pty Ltd (2021) 7 QR 34), McMurdo and Fraser JJA and Jackson J all disagreed with the primary judge's findings in respect of the licence point. Their Honour's disagreement was in relation to whether the footpath was part of the road, not in relation to whether payment rights under the BIF Act are suspended if unlicensed building work is performed.

Ingeteam

In Ingeteam Australia Pty Ltd v Susan River Solar Pty Ltd [2024] QSC 30, the claimant applied for adjudication in respect of a ~$2.39m payment claim, but the respondent argued the claimant was unlicensed because of a $294 plywood "floor repair". The adjudicator, without giving the claimant a chance to respond, found the repair was "building work" (for the purposes of the Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld)), and accordingly found he had no jurisdiction under the BIF Act. The Court held the adjudicator had denied procedural fairness to the claimant and misapplied the "floating floor" and sub-$3,300 exemption (so no licence was required). Because the adjudicator's licensing findings were jurisdictional errors that would wrongly bind later adjudications via Dualcorp estoppel, Applegarth J declared the adjudicator's licensing findings void (in part) for jurisdictional error.

Practice tips

  • As a claimant, do a licence–scope audit for every item/variation, and if using the head-contractor exemption, require and file proof that only appropriately licensed subcontractors will perform building work.
  • Respondents to adjudication applications should perform QBCC licence searches to check whether the claimant held the appropriate licence(s) at all material times.

Within six months of work

Pursuant to section 75(2) of the BIF Act, unless the payment claim relates to a final payment, an interim payment claim must be given before the end of whichever of the following periods is the longest:

Section 75(2) BIF Act – Making payment claim
75 Making payment claim

(2)  Unless the payment claim relates to a final payment, the claim must be given before the end of whichever of the following periods is the longest—

(a)  the period, if any, worked out under the relevant construction contract; or

(b)  6 months after the construction work to which the claim relates was last carried out or the related goods and services to which the claim relates were last supplied.

Is this a jurisdictional requirement?

Compliance with section 75(2)(b) is a jurisdictional fact - an objective requirement that must actually be satisfied, not merely something the adjudicator forms an opinion about. If a payment claim does not comply with section 75(2)(b), it is invalid and any adjudication decision based on it will be void.

In Forme Two Pty Ltd v McNab Developments (Qld) Pty Ltd [2025] QSC 96, Hindman J stated at [42]:

"I am persuaded that compliance with s 75(2)(b) of the BIF Act is a category 1 matter. That properly acknowledges the importance of time under the statutory scheme, and the use of mandatory language. It is a matter that should be able to be readily determined by the Court in most cases."

Her Honour concluded at [3]:

"...I conclude that the Decision is void because the payment claim on which the Decision is based was not a valid payment claim. That is because it did not contain any claim for payment for works performed in the six months prior to the payment claim being given. I find that is a jurisdictional fact that was not satisfied."

This approach follows earlier Queensland authority. In South East Civil and Drainage Contractors Pty Ltd v AMGW Pty Ltd [2013] 2 Qd R 189, Jackson J held at [51]-[55] that non-compliance with the predecessor provision (section 17(4) of the BCIPA) rendered both the payment claim and adjudication decision invalid.

It also aligns with SHA Premier Constructions Pty Ltd v Niclin Constructions Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 307, where Bond J held at [36]-[38] that compliance with the timing requirement for final payment claims under section 75(3) was an objective jurisdictional fact.

What does "construction work to which the claim relates" mean?

The critical interpretative question is whether section 75(2)(b) requires that the payment claim includes a claim for payment for some work carried out in the six months prior to giving the claim, or whether it is sufficient that any work under the contract was done in that period (whether or not that work is actually claimed).

The payment claim must include a claim for payment for at least some work carried out within the six-month period. It is not enough that work was done under the contract generally if none of that work is the subject of the payment claim.

The foundational New South Wales authority (which has been followed in Queensland) is Estate Property Holdings Pty Ltd v Barclay Mowlem Construction Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 515. Hodgson JA (with whom Mason P and Giles JA agreed) stated at 519 [18]:

"...in my opinion 'construction work … to which the claim relates' in s 13(4)(b) is also the construction work for which payment is claimed in the claim; and accordingly, the requirement of s 13(4)(b) is that some of that construction work be carried out in the relevant twelve month period…."

Her Honour confirmed the practical effect at 520 [21]:

"…This is further confirmed by s 13(6), which suggests that items more than twelve months old may be included in a payment claim, when they have been included in previous claims, so long as the payment claim does relate to some work carried out within the twelve month period."

This reasoning was expressly adopted and applied to section 75(2)(b) of the BIF Act in Forme Two Pty Ltd v McNab Developments (Qld) Pty Ltd [2025] QSC 96. Hindman J stated at [31]:

"The approach in Estate Property Holdings, particularly at [17]-[21], is the correct approach to apply to the BIF Act. It gives effect to the words 'to which the claim relates' in s 75(2)(b) of the BIF Act. It allows the section to have operation in relation to all interim payments – even when the work is not wholly complete. It allows the distinction to operate effectively between interim payments dealt with in s 75(2) and the final payment dealt with in s 75(3) that will come into operation when all the work is actually complete."

The practical effect is that you can include old work (more than six months old) in a payment claim, but only if you also include at least some work done within the six-month period.

Does section 75(2)(a) or section 75(2)(b) apply?

Section 75(2) requires that the claim must be given before the end of whichever of the two periods is the longest: (a) the period worked out under the construction contract; or (b) six months after work was last carried out.

The key question is when section 75(2)(a) applies such that the contractual period governs (rather than the six-month default). Section 75(2)(a) only applies if the contract provides for a period within which claims must be served - not merely when claims can be made or how often they can be made.

In Evans Built Pty Ltd v United Petroleum Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 223, Burns J stated at [18]:

"...the difficulty with Evans' argument is that clause 37.1 and Item 28 of the general conditions of contract do no more than stipulate the frequency with which progress claims can be made under the contract. They say nothing about the period within which progress claims must be served. Nor do clause 37.4 and the contents of the required Deed of Release allow for that period to be worked out; clause 37.4 is solely concerned with the making of a final payment claim...To adapt what Walmsley AJ said in St Hillers Property, clause 37.1 taken with Item 28 merely provide for how often progress claims can be made and clause 37.4 only provides for when a final payment claim can be made."

The distinction is this: a clause that says claims can be made "monthly" or "on the 25th of each month" specifies frequency, not a period for service. Section 75(2)(a) does not apply. By contrast, a clause that says claims must be served "within X days after work is done" specifies a period for service, and section 75(2)(a) applies. If section 75(2)(a) does not apply, the default six-month period under section 75(2)(b) governs.

When does work need to be done?

The work must be carried out in the six months prior to the giving of the payment claim - not prior to the reference date.

In Forme Two Pty Ltd v McNab Developments (Qld) Pty Ltd [2025] QSC 96, McNab conceded (at [51]) "that the payment claim did not include any claim for an amount on account of work undertaken during the period six months before the payment claim was given." The adjudicator had concluded (wrongly, as it turned out) that section 75(2)(b) did not apply because McNab had done work after the last work claimed - but Hindman J held this was irrelevant. Her Honour stated at [53]:

"Accordingly, McNab's concession is a sufficient basis upon which I can act to conclude that s 75(2)(b) of the BIF Act was not in fact satisfied in this case. Regardless of that concession, I would otherwise accept Forme Two's submissions...that persuasively demonstrate why, on a consideration of the relevant payment claim and the evidence...it is properly concluded that s 75(2)(b) of the BIF Act was not in fact satisfied in this case."

Relationship to section 75(3) (final payment claims)

Section 75(2) applies to interim payment claims. Section 75(3) applies to final payment claims.

For final payment claims, the claim must be given before the end of whichever of the following periods is the longest: (a) the period worked out under the contract; (b) 28 days after the end of the last defects liability period; (c) 6 months after completion of all construction work; or (d) 6 months after complete supply of all related goods and services.

The key difference is that section 75(3)(c) refers to completion of all work under the contract, whereas section 75(2)(b) refers to when work to which the claim relates was last carried out.

In SHA Premier Constructions Pty Ltd v Niclin Constructions Pty Ltd [2020] QSC 307, Bond J stated at [38]:

"...on the proper construction of the Act, the valid exercise of an adjudicator's jurisdiction is conditioned on the claim having been given before the end of the longest of the periods provided by s 75(3). Whether or not that has occurred is an objective fact...it would be an objective jurisdictional fact."

Her Honour explained the operation of section 75(3)(c) in the context of termination at [43](c):

"...once the contracts had been terminated, Niclin had neither the obligation nor the entitlement to carry out any construction work under the contracts. Accordingly, once the contracts had been terminated, the proper assessment of the relationship between the parties in relation to each contract was that there was no longer any further construction work 'to be carried out under the construction contract'. In every real sense, termination brought about the 'completion' (in the sense of 'conclusion') of all construction work to be carried out under the construction contracts."

Practice tips

For interim claims (section 75(2)):

  • Check if there's a contractual period that specifies when claims must be served (not just how often). If not, the six-month rule applies.
  • Always include at least some recent work - work done within the six months before you serve the claim.
  • You can include old work (more than six months old) provided you also claim for at least some work done in the last six months.
  • If all work stopped more than six months ago and you want to make an interim claim, you're likely out of time (unless the contract provides a longer period under section 75(2)(a)).

For final claims (section 75(3)):

  • Usually you have six months from completion of all work (or termination, if earlier).
  • If there's a defects liability period, you may have 28 days after it ends (if that's longer).
  • Check the contract - it might give you longer still.

Identify the payment claim

Pursuant to section 69(a) of the BIF Act, a payment schedule must identify the payment claim to which it responds.

Section 69 BIF Act – Meaning of payment schedule

69 Meaning of payment schedule

A payment schedule, responding to a payment claim, is a written document that—

(a) identifies the payment claim to which it responds; and

(b) states the amount of the payment, if any, that the respondent proposes to make; and

(c) if the amount proposed to be paid is less than the amount stated in the payment claim—states why the amount proposed to be paid is less, including the respondent's reasons for withholding any payment; and

(d) includes the other information prescribed by regulation.

Minimum requirements for identification

In Vannella Pty Limited atf Capitalist Family Trust v TFM Epping Land Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1379, Henry J considered whether an email entitled "Your Client's Claims" was a valid payment schedule. His Honour held, at [447]:

A valid payment schedule need not be a formal document but it must, at the very least, identify the claim to which it is responding, what the respondent proposes to pay instead, and what parts of the claim are objected to and why.

In that case, Decon had served a progress claim on the defendants by email under cover of a letter from Decon's solicitors referring to "our client's Progress Claim dated 3 June 2019". The defendants responded on 14 June with an email titled "Your Client's Claims". Decon subsequently sought summary judgment against the defendants for the amount claimed, on the basis that the defendants had failed to submit a valid payment schedule.

The Court held that the email was not a valid payment schedule for three key reasons. First, at [451] to [456], the Court found:

First, the 14 June email fails to identify the payment claim to which it relates, being Progress Claim 10. There is no reference whatsoever to a claim made on 3 June 2019. The reference to "Your Clients' Claims" is in very general terms, encapsulating claims made by both Decon and Vannella. Given there had been a number of progress claims made by Decon in the past, the general reference to "claims" could refer to one or more of those past claims. It could also have been a reference to the claims made in the Equity proceedings, given those proceedings had been commenced on 17 May 2019, they also raised claims by Decon under the Building Contract, and the 14 June email was sent by the lawyers representing the defendants in the Equity proceedings.

The Court concluded, at [453], that "the general reference to 'claims' could refer to one or more of those past claims" and was therefore too broad and did not directly respond to the specific payment claim.

His Honour further held, at [463], that the email failed its essential function:

Simply put, the 14 June email does not inform Decon of the "metes and bounds" of the dispute to enable it to decide whether to engage in adjudication.

Payment schedule addressing only one component of payment claim is invalid

In Denham Construction Pty Ltd v Islamic Republic of Pakistan (No 2) (2016) 311 FLR 187; [2016] ACTSC 215, Mossop AsJ considered a payment schedule that responded to only part of a payment claim. His Honour held that a payment schedule which only addresses one component of the payment claim does not satisfy the requirement to identify the payment claim to which it relates.

In that case, the respondent had issued a document responding to a claim for variations (designated "DCV075") which formed part of Payment Claim 26, but the document did not address the other components of Payment Claim 26. At [34], Mossop AsJ stated:

In my opinion the email does not identify the payment claim to which it relates. That is because it is not directed to the payment claim at all. Rather, it is directed to the claim for a variation which forms one component of the amounts claimed as part of Payment Claim 26. Unlike Minimax, there is no coincidence between the document which is referred to and the contents of the claim. While the amounts claimed as part of DCV075 form a significant component of the amounts claimed as part of Progress Claim 26, that is not sufficient to make it clear that it is a response to the payment claim as opposed to being a communication in relation to another document generated for the purposes of the underlying contract which happened to relate to one component of the payment claim.

This principle emphasises that a payment schedule must respond to the payment claim as a whole, not merely selected components of it, even if those components form a significant part of the claimed amount. The purpose of a payment schedule is to identify what amounts are in dispute and why, in respect of the entire payment claim.

Significant errors may prevent identification

In NewGrow Pty Ltd v Buxton Constructions (Vic) Pty Ltd [2019] VCC 464, Cosgrave J was required to consider the validity of a number of payment schedules served by the defendant and determine whether they were issued in compliance with the equivalent Victorian legislation. The defendant had issued a schedule in response to a payment claim within the time frame imposed by the Act and reissued a second schedule for the same claim outside the time frame.

For the first schedule, the Court held that given the significant number of errors contained in the payment schedule, a reasonable person would be justifiably confused about whether the schedule related to the corresponding claim, such that the schedule failed to satisfy the identification requirement. The Court's reasoning was that the cumulative effect of multiple errors, inconsistencies, and ambiguities made it objectively unclear which payment claim the schedule purported to address.

As a result of the first schedule's invalidity, the second schedule which revised the first could not be valid. Further, it was served out of time and could not be a schedule in its own right. This decision highlights that respondents cannot cure a defective payment schedule by issuing a corrected version outside the statutory timeframe.

Incorporation of documents by reference

Where a respondent seeks to incorporate previous documents into a payment schedule by reference, those documents must be identified with sufficient particularity to allow the recipient to identify them. In Vannella Pty Limited atf Capitalist Family Trust v TFM Epping Land Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1379, at [469], Henry J held:

The 14 June email refers to "previous…communications" about what sums were paid and what remained outstanding. Any documents that a party purports to incorporate by reference must be identified with sufficient particularity to allow the recipient to identify the documents... The reference in the 14 June email to "previous…communications" does not satisfy this threshold, failing as it does to identify key details such as the dates of these communications.

Practice tips

  • Clearly reference the payment claim by date, number, or other unique identifier (e.g. "This is a payment schedule in response to Payment Claim No. 7 dated 15 March 2025").
  • Ensure the payment schedule addresses all components of the payment claim, not just selected items.
  • Avoid generic titles like "Your Claims" that could refer to multiple payment claims or other contractual claims.
  • If reissuing a payment schedule, ensure it is done within the statutory timeframe (otherwise the original defective schedule will render the reissue invalid).
  • If incorporating previous documents by reference, identify them with sufficient particularity (including dates and descriptions) to allow the claimant to locate them.

State the scheduled amount

Pursuant to section 69(b) of the BIF Act, a payment schedule must state the amount of the payment, if any, that the respondent proposes to make.

Section 69(b) BIF Act – Meaning of payment schedule

69 Meaning of payment schedule

A payment schedule, responding to a payment claim, is a written document that—

...

(b) states the amount of the payment, if any, that the respondent proposes to make; and

...

Contractual deeming clauses and superintendent's certificates

The relationship between contractual deeming provisions and the statutory requirements for payment schedules was considered in two related decisions by the Queensland Supreme Court and Court of Appeal.

In Kangaroo Point Developments MP Property Pty Ltd v RHG Construction Fitout and Maintenance Pty Ltd [2021] QSC 30, Justice Dalton determined that a superintendent's assessment of a payment claim did not constitute a payment schedule within the meaning of section 69 of the BIF Act on the basis that the document did not state the amount of the payment, if any, that the respondent proposed to make as required by section 69(b) of the BIF Act.

In that case, the construction contract provided that any assessment of a payment claim provided by the superintendent "shall constitute a payment schedule for the purposes of the Security of Payment Act". The superintendent's certificate stated the superintendent's opinion as to the amount payable, but did not expressly state the amount that the respondent (the developer) proposed to pay.

In assessing the validity of the superintendent's assessment, Justice Dalton held that the contractual deeming provision could not deem a document, which did not comply with section 69 of the BIF Act, as a payment schedule. As such, the failure to state the amount that the respondent proposed to pay was fatal to its validity as a payment schedule.

However, on appeal in RHG Construction Fitout and Maintenance Pty Ltd v Kangaroo Point Developments MP Property Pty Ltd [2021] QCA 117, the Queensland Court of Appeal overturned the Supreme Court's decision. The Court of Appeal held that the superintendent's schedule, when read together with the contractual deeming provision, did satisfy section 69(b) of the BIF Act.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeal held that:

  • to view the deeming clause as ineffective would constitute a failure to give the contract a business-like interpretation and would be ignoring the parties' use of long-standing statutory terms in their contractual arrangements; and
  • the superintendent's schedule, when read with the deeming provision in the contract, meant that the amount stated in the schedule was the amount the developer proposed to pay and therefore section 69(b) of the Act was satisfied.

The effect of this decision is that where a contract contains a deeming provision stating that a superintendent's certificate "shall constitute" a payment schedule, the certificate can satisfy section 69(b) even if it expresses the amount as the superintendent's opinion rather than explicitly stating what the respondent proposes to pay. The certificate must be read together with the contractual deeming clause to ascertain whether the statutory requirement is met.

Stating a nil amount

A payment schedule may propose to pay a nil amount, and such a proposal can be either express or implied from the circumstances.

In Minimax Fire Fighting Systems Pty Ltd v Bremore Engineering (WA) Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 333, Chesterman J considered whether an email refusing to accept an invoice constituted a payment schedule. The respondent's email stated "we accept not your invoice but we suggest to have a meeting on site next year to clarify the situation and to find a solution for both sides."

His Honour held that this amounted to a proposal to pay nil. At [246] to [248], Chesterman J stated:

Although the grammar is incorrect the meaning is perfectly clear... He made it quite clear that the applicant did not accept invoice 1282 which can only mean that it did not propose to make any payment pursuant to it. Any doubt there might be (and I think there is none) is removed by the suggestion that there be a site meeting, the purpose of which was to reach agreement on what might be payable pursuant to the invoice. The second criterion is satisfied. The email stated the amount, if any, that the applicant proposed to make. The amount was nil. There is no reason why a complete refusal to pay any money pursuant to an invoice is a statement of the amount if any that someone proposes to make.

Similarly, in ACP Properties (Townsville) Pty Ltd v Rodrigues Construction Group Pty Ltd [2021] QSC 45, Bradley J determined that two emails sent from the respondent stating that it considered no amount was payable in respect of the claimant's invoices, and that it proposed to pay an amount of $nil as a result of their contractual arrangement capping the amount payable, was sufficient to constitute a payment schedule for the purposes of sections 69(b) and (c) of the BIF Act.

The Court accepted that the respondent's position was sufficiently clear: it proposed to pay nothing, and it gave reasons for that position based on the contractual cap on amounts payable.

In BCS Infrastructure Support Pty Ltd v Jones Lang Lasalle (NSW) Pty Ltd [2020] VSC 739, Stynes J held that a "nil" amount can be inferred for the purpose of the equivalent NSW provision, where the respondent does not dispute the validity of a payment claim and expresses an intention not to pay the claimant any amount. At [97], Stynes J stated:

...where a respondent does not dispute the validity of a payment claim and expresses an intention not to pay the claimant any amount, a "nil" amount may be inferred...

However, the document must make the respondent's position sufficiently clear. In Vannella Pty Limited atf Capitalist Family Trust v TFM Epping Land Pty Ltd [2019] NSWSC 1379, at [457], Henry J found that an email which "states that there are doubts as to whether the defendants owe Decon money at all" and which "leaves open the question of whether, and in what amount, payment will be made" did not satisfy the requirement to indicate the scheduled amount, stating:

...the 14 June email does not indicate the amount that the defendants propose to pay instead of the claimed amount. It states that there are doubts as to whether the defendants owe Decon money at all. It leaves open the question of whether, and in what amount, payment will be made, and it certainly does not identify a particular amount for payment.

The distinction is important: a statement that the respondent proposes to pay nil (or nothing) is sufficient, but a statement expressing uncertainty about whether anything is owed, or leaving open the possibility of future payment, is not sufficient to indicate the scheduled amount.

Practice tips

  • Always state a specific dollar amount that the respondent proposes to pay, even if that amount is $0.
  • If proposing to pay nil, be clear and definitive—avoid language that suggests uncertainty or that the position might change (e.g. avoid "we doubt whether anything is owed" or "we will consider payment later").
  • If relying on a contractual deeming clause (e.g. superintendent's certificate "shall constitute" a payment schedule), ensure the document when read with the clause clearly states the amount proposed to be paid by the respondent.
  • Do not leave the scheduled amount ambiguous or subject to further consideration—the payment schedule must make the respondent's position clear at the time of service.

Reasons for withholding

Pursuant to section 69(c) of the BIF Act, if the amount proposed to be paid in a payment schedule is less than the amount stated in the payment claim, the payment schedule must state why the amount proposed to be paid is less, including the respondent's reasons for withholding any payment.

Section 69(c) BIF Act – Meaning of payment schedule

69 Meaning of payment schedule

A payment schedule, responding to a payment claim, is a written document that—

...

(c) if the amount proposed to be paid is less than the amount stated in the payment claim—states why the amount proposed to be paid is less, including the respondent's reasons for withholding any payment; and

...

Payment schedule must address the entire payment claim

In Turnkey Innovative Engineering Pty Ltd v Witron Australia Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 981, Stevenson J considered whether a payment schedule was invalid if it failed to "indicate" reasons for withholding payment for a specific part of the payment claim. This case provides important guidance on the requirement that reasons must address all disputed components of a claim.

In that case, the payment claim had two components: (1) $499,924.63 for contract works calculated on an increased contract price, and (2) $304,230 for variations (representing some 40% of the total claim). The respondent's email stated it would "review your variations and your new pricing" and that the claimant could "claim progress for April based on the original contract price". The respondent instructed the claimant to "please adjust your claim accordingly and resubmit for approval".

Stevenson J held that the words "please adjust your claim accordingly and resubmit for approval" was sufficient to indicate to the contractor that its reasons for non-payment of the contract works component was that it disagreed with the repricing of the contract. At [177], His Honour stated:

The component of the payment claim directed to contract works was, as I have said, calculated on the basis of the Contractor's proposed Contract price of $14,141,951.32: the "new pricing" referred to in the opening sentence of the Email. In the Email, the Principal stated that it was reviewing that new pricing. That statement, combined with the statement in the following paragraph that the Contractor could, and inferentially should, make a claim "based on the original contract price" made clear enough, in my opinion, that the reason given by the Principal for withholding payment was that it had not yet agreed to the new pricing.

However, the payment claim also included a claim for variations totalling $304,230. At [181] to [183], Stevenson J found that the email did not indicate any reason for withholding payment of this component:

But the payment claim also claimed $304,290 for variations. This was some 40% of the Contractor's claim. The Email did not indicate, in any way, the reason that the Principal was withholding payment in respect to that component of the payment claim. The Email said no more than that, after it saw "real progress on the handing over" of the completed Group Control areas, it would "review your variations". The Email thus did not indicate why the Principal proposed to make no payment at all in response to the payment claim. Nor did it indicate the Principal's reasons for withholding payment of the entirety of the amount claimed by the Contractor in the payment claim. Thus, it did not comply with the requirements of s 14(3) of the Act.

At [139], His Honour emphasised the fundamental purpose of reasons in payment schedules:

It is not sufficient that a document purporting to be a payment schedule takes issue with part of the claim made in the payment claim but does not address the balance. That is because "the whole purpose of such a document is to identify what amounts are in dispute and why".

This principle was also firmly established in the Queensland case of Minimax Fire Fighting Systems Pty Ltd v Bremore Engineering (WA) Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 333. In that case, the payment claim sought three separate amounts. The respondent's email provided reasons for refusing to pay the first item (additional labour costs) but said nothing at all about the second and third items (overtime adjustments and refund of discount, totalling almost $88,000).

Chesterman J held, at [256] to [258], that the failure to address all components of the claim was fatal:

Significantly, the email does not deal at all with the claims for almost $88,000, seeking adjustments for overtime underpaid and a refund of discounts allowed for prompt payment which was not made. Mr Knop made it clear that the applicant would pay nothing in response to the invoice. He explained why it would pay nothing with respect to claim 1 but said nothing at all about claims 2 and 3... If the applicant had no objection to paying those amounts the Act required it to say so in its payment schedule. The whole purpose of such a document is to identify what amounts are in dispute and why. The delivery of a payment claim and a payment schedule is meant to identify, at an early stage, the parameters of a dispute about payment for the quick and informal adjudication process for which the Act provides. ...the email is incomplete if it is intended to be a payment schedule. It had to address the claim made and not only a part of it. I think this is clear.

This decision makes clear that a payment schedule must address the entire payment claim. Where a claim has multiple components, the respondent must provide reasons for withholding payment in respect of each component, not just some of them.

Mere statement of when payment will be made is insufficient

In Joye Group Pty Ltd v Cemco Projects Pty Ltd [2021] NSWCA 211, the NSW Court of Appeal overturned the District Court's findings that a refusal to pay two payment claims until work was complete was sufficient reasoning for withholding payment under the equivalent NSW provision.

In the District Court decision, Strathdee DCJ found that a valid payment schedule was given by the respondent, as the background communications between the parties clarified the works that were incomplete and that thus the respondent provided reasons for withholding payment.

In overturning the District Court's finding and determining that the payment schedule was invalid, the Court of Appeal held, at [35] to [37]:

Self-evidently, a statement to the effect, "we do not intend to pay your claim" does not provide a reason for non-payment. Further, a statement that "we will not pay your claim until …" is not even a statement that part or all of the claim will not be paid, but merely a statement as to when some or all may be paid. It leaves open the possibility that there is no dispute between the parties that the work the subject of the claim has been carried out.

The Court of Appeal further held that even if there was only one item that was the subject of the payment claim, a refusal to make payment until work had been completed does not demonstrate which of the items identified in the payment claim had been carried out before the reference date for which the claimant would be entitled to payment.

Importantly, at [44], the Court of Appeal also held that external materials cannot be used to reconstruct a deficient payment schedule:

A payment schedule is not to be reconstructed by reference to external materials, so as to give it a degree of particularity which it simply did not enjoy.

This principle makes clear that a respondent cannot rely on previous correspondence or background communications to provide the reasons required by section 69(c). The reasons must be stated in the payment schedule itself (or in documents properly incorporated into it).

Reasons must be stated with sufficient particularity

In Multiplex Constructions Pty Ltd v Luikens [2003] NSWSC 1140, Palmer J considered the level of particularity required for reasons in a payment schedule. His Honour held, at [68] and [70]:

Section 14(3) requires that if the respondent to a payment claim has "any reason" for "withholding payment", it must indicate that reason in the payment schedule... The phrase, in the context of the subsection as a whole, simply means "withholding payment of all or any part of the claimed amount in the payment claim". If the respondent has any reason whatsoever for withholding payment of all or any part of the payment claim, s.14(3) requires that that reason be indicated in the payment schedule... For a respondent merely to state in its payment schedule that a claim is rejected is no more informative than to say merely that payment of the claim is "withheld": the result is stated but not the reason for arriving at the result. Section 14(3) requires that reasons for withholding payment of a claim be indicated in the payment schedule with sufficient particularity to enable the claimant to understand, at least in broad outline, what is the issue between it and the respondent. This understanding is necessary so that the claimant may decide whether to pursue the claim and may know what is the nature of the respondent's case which it will have to meet if it decides to pursue the claim by referring it to adjudication.

The purpose of this requirement, as Palmer J explained at [67], is to prevent a respondent from "ambushing" the claimant by serving a payment schedule that says nothing except that the claim is rejected, and then disclosing the reasons for rejection for the first time in the adjudication response.

Substantive dispute over pricing is a valid reason

In BCS Infrastructure Support Pty Ltd v Jones Lang Lasalle (NSW) Pty Ltd [2020] VSC 739, Stynes J determined that the substantive dispute between parties with regards to pricing was a valid reason for withholding payment under the equivalent Victorian provision on the basis that:

  1. it was clear that the payment schedule in issue was in response to the payment claims;
  2. the scope of the dispute was described with some particularity; and
  3. it was irrelevant whether the claimant believed that there was a dispute between the parties.

This decision confirms that a pricing dispute, if described with sufficient particularity, can constitute a valid reason for withholding payment. The respondent need not prove that its reasons are correct or justified—the Act only requires that reasons be indicated. However, the reasons must be sufficiently clear to enable the claimant to understand the nature of the dispute.

Payment schedules cannot incorporate documents by mere reference

In Perform (NSW) Pty Ltd v Mev-Aus Pty Ltd t/as Novatec Construction Systems [2009] NSWCA 157, the New South Wales Court of Appeal indicated that (although it was not necessary to ultimately decide) a respondent cannot include in a payment schedule previous documents that have passed between the parties, simply by way of reference to such documents. Rather, the Court of Appeal appeared to be suggesting that only those documents actually included and provided with the payment schedule could be construed as forming part of the payment schedule.

In reaching this conclusion the Court noted that an approach which would permit a party, by the so-called incorporation route, to purport to include in the payment schedule all manner of previous documents claimed to have passed between the parties, could lead to mayhem, where time is of the essence in relation to the critical significance of the steps to be taken by the respective parties under the Act.

This principle reinforces that reasons must be contained within the payment schedule itself (or in clearly identified documents provided with it), rather than requiring the claimant to search through previous correspondence to piece together the respondent's case.

Practice tips

  • Provide reasons for withholding payment for every disputed item in the payment claim, not just selected items or components.
  • Be specific about why amounts are being withheld (e.g. "work incomplete", "defective work", "pricing dispute", "set-off for damages")—identify which work is incomplete, what defects exist, or what the pricing dispute relates to.
  • State reasons with sufficient particularity to enable the claimant to understand "at least in broad outline" what the issue is—merely stating "claim rejected" is insufficient.
  • Avoid vague statements like "payment will be made when work is complete"—explain which specific work is incomplete and why that affects entitlement to payment under the contract or the BIF Act.
  • Include all supporting documents with the payment schedule rather than incorporating previous correspondence by reference only.
  • Do not rely on external communications or background context to provide the reasons—the payment schedule itself must contain sufficient reasons to enable the claimant to understand the dispute and decide whether to pursue adjudication.
  • Remember that the reasons do not need to be correct or justified—they simply need to be stated with sufficient clarity to inform the claimant of the nature of the dispute.

What constitutes a payment schedule

The BIF Act does not prescribe a particular form for a payment schedule. However, the courts have considered various issues relating to whether a document (or multiple documents) can constitute a valid payment schedule.

Informal documents may constitute a payment schedule

In Gisley Investments Pty Ltd v Williams [2010] QSC 178, the Queensland Supreme Court examined whether a relatively informal email could be considered a valid payment schedule under the Act. The Court said that speed and informality was the object of the Act and as long as the essential criteria were satisfied, an informal email could constitute a payment schedule under the Act.

Further, the Court held that the statement in the email, "whilst the job continues to remain unfinished, final payment is not yet owed" amounted to a proposed payment of nil and provided sufficient reasons for that proposed payment. Consequently, the email satisfied the necessary elements of a payment schedule and was deemed so under the Act.

This principle was reinforced in Minimax Fire Fighting Systems Pty Ltd v Bremore Engineering (WA) Pty Ltd [2007] QSC 333, where Chesterman J held, at [235] and [242]:

The Act emphasises speed and informality. Accordingly one should not approach the question whether a document satisfies the description of a payment schedule (or payment claim for that matter) from an unduly critical viewpoint. No particular form is required. One is concerned only with whether the content of the document in question satisfies the statutory description... ...How they are expressed, with what formality or lack of it, and with what felicity or awkwardness, will not matter.

These decisions confirm that formality is not a requirement for a valid payment schedule. What matters is whether the document contains the essential statutory elements: identification of the payment claim, statement of the scheduled amount, and reasons for withholding payment (if the scheduled amount is less than the claimed amount).

Not every response within time is a payment schedule

However, in McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Heavy Plant Leasing Pty Ltd [2013] QSC 223, the Supreme Court held that whilst an informal response to a payment claim can be a payment schedule, there is no authority for the proposition that the first correspondence sent by a party following receipt of a payment claim is a payment schedule, or "the proposition that a document which does not purport to be a payment schedule must be considered to be a payment schedule if it was delivered within the statutory timeframe".

Whether a response to a payment claim is a payment schedule depends "upon all of the circumstances of the case" (at [48]), and whether the response contains the necessary elements of a payment schedule as outlined in section 69 of the BIF Act.

This principle emphasises that merely responding to a payment claim within the statutory timeframe is not sufficient—the response must actually satisfy the statutory requirements to be a valid payment schedule. A respondent cannot rely on having sent something within time if that document does not meet the requirements of section 69.

Course of dealing and provisional language may indicate document is not a payment schedule

The position was clarified on appeal in Heavy Plant Leasing Pty Ltd v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd [2013] QCA 386, in which the Court of Appeal held that a document, despite being in compliance with section 69, will not necessarily be a payment schedule in the following circumstances:

(a) Where there has been a course of dealing between parties in which documents have been identified as payment schedules in a clear and consistent way, a document that lacks such identification is not likely to be a payment schedule. A subsequent document identified as a payment schedule would evince adherence to, and continuance of, the previous course of conduct, and confirm that the earlier document is not a payment schedule. (b) A document that contains provisional or suggestive language to the effect that a further and more detailed response to the payment claim will be forthcoming is not likely to be a payment schedule.

These principles recognise that context matters. If parties have consistently used formal payment schedules clearly labelled as such, an informal response lacking that identification is less likely to be considered a payment schedule. Similarly, language suggesting that the document is preliminary or that a fuller response will follow indicates that the document is not intended to be the respondent's final payment schedule.

Contractual payment schedule timeframes

In Allencon Pty Ltd v Palmgrove Holdings Pty Ltd trading as Carruthers Contracting [2023] QCA 6, the Queensland Court of Appeal considered the interaction between contractual timeframes for payment schedules and the statutory timeframe under section 76 of the BIF Act.

Section 76(1) provides that if given a payment claim, a respondent must respond by giving the claimant a payment schedule within whichever of the following periods ends first: (a) the period, if any, within which the respondent must give the payment schedule under the relevant construction contract; or (b) 15 business days after the payment claim is given to the respondent.

In Allencon, the subcontract required the payment schedule to be given within 21 calendar days. The respondent argued that the contract did not provide a "period" within the meaning of section 76(1)(a), and therefore only the statutory 15 business day period applied. The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, holding that the contractual 21 calendar day period was a period within which the payment schedule had to be given under the contract, and therefore section 76(1)(a) applied. As that period expired before the statutory 15 business day period, the respondent was required to give the payment schedule within 21 calendar days.

Multiple documents may constitute a payment schedule

In Heavy Plant Leasing Pty Ltd v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd [2013] QCA 386, the Court of Appeal also noted that it is not implicit in the legislation that a payment schedule must consist of only one document. Multiple documents may, and often will, constitute a payment schedule. The Court remarked that the content of a particular document and its relevance to the other documents will be telling of whether that document constitutes part of the payment schedule.

Accompanying documents may be provided at the same time as the payment schedule, or may have been provided earlier and incorporated by reference into the payment schedule. A respondent cannot, however, supply the claimant with additional documentation that completes an otherwise incomplete payment schedule after service of the payment schedule.

In Heavy Plant Leasing Pty Ltd v McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd [2013] QCA 386 the Court made the following important observation:

A claimant cannot be expected on its own initiative to compose a payment schedule for the respondent by assembling miscellaneous documents received from the respondent until the assembled materials satisfy the requirements of s 18 of the Act.

This principle makes clear that while multiple documents may together constitute a payment schedule, the respondent must make it clear which documents form part of the payment schedule. The claimant should not have to guess or search through various documents to piece together the respondent's position.

Practice tips

  • While formality is not required, clearly label the document as a "payment schedule" to avoid ambiguity, particularly if there has been a course of dealing where formal payment schedules have been used.
  • Ensure the payment schedule is complete when served—do not suggest that a further, more detailed response will follow, as this may indicate the document is not intended to be a payment schedule.
  • Check whether the construction contract specifies a timeframe for giving a payment schedule—if it does, that timeframe may apply under section 76(1)(a) if it expires before the statutory 15 business day period.
  • If using multiple documents as a payment schedule, ensure they are all provided together (or clearly incorporated by reference with sufficient particularity) at the time of service.
  • Maintain consistency with past practice—if you have previously used formal payment schedules clearly identified as such, continue to do so to avoid disputes about whether a particular document is a payment schedule.
  • Include all necessary elements (identification, scheduled amount, and reasons) within the payment schedule itself or in clearly identified accompanying documents.
  • Do not expect the claimant to assemble various documents to create a payment schedule—make clear what constitutes your payment schedule response.

Requirements of an adjudication application

Form S79

The application must be made in the approved form (Form S79) and filed with an Authorised Nominating Authority (ANA), not the QBCC.

Requirements of an adjudication application

Identify the claim/schedule

The application must identify the payment claim and the payment schedule (if any) to which it relates. Copies of these documents must be attached.

Requirements of an adjudication application

Pay prescribed fee

The claimant must pay the application fee charged by the ANA. Failure to pay the fee means the application is not considered "made" and may fall out of time.

Requirements of an adjudication application

Not outside four corners

The adjudication application (including its submissions) cannot raise new claims or reasons that were not included in the original payment claim. The application is limited to the issues and amounts claimed in the payment claim and responded to in the payment schedule.

Requirements of an adjudication response

Not exceed reasons for withholding payment

An adjudication response can only include reasons for withholding payment that were first raised in the payment schedule. A respondent cannot introduce new arguments, new expert reports, or new reasons for non-payment at this stage. This is why the payment schedule is so important.

Service

Service of payment claim

The payment claim must be served on the person liable to make the payment, as identified in the contract. Service must be in accordance with the contract's "notice" provisions (e.g., to a specific email address or physical address).

Service

Service of payment schedule

The payment schedule must be served on the claimant within the strict statutory timeframe (15 business days or as per the contract). Service must also comply with the contract's notice provisions.

Service

Service of adjudication application

A copy of the adjudication application must be served on the respondent, either before or immediately after it is filed with the ANA.

Service

Service of adjudication response

A copy of the adjudication response must be served on the claimant and the adjudicator within the time allowed by the Act or the adjudicator.

Adjudicator’s decision

What the Adjudicator must consider

The adjudicator *must* consider the provisions of the BIF Act, the contract, the payment claim, the payment schedule, the adjudication application, and the adjudication response (and all submissions and evidence properly included within them).

Adjudicator’s decision

What the Adjudicator must not consider

The adjudicator *must not* consider an adjudication response that was not served on time. They also *must not* consider any reasons for withholding payment that were not included in the payment schedule. This is the key "four corners" doctrine of security of payment.

Adjudicator’s decision

Timing of decision

An adjudicator must make their decision within 10 business days of receiving the adjudication response, or within a longer period if agreed by the parties. This tight timeframe is a key feature of the "pay now, argue later" regime.

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Identify the construction works

Pursuant to section 68(1)(a) of the BIF Act, a payment claim must identify the construction work or related goods and services to which it relates.

Section 68(1)(a) BIF Act – Meaning of payment claim
68 Meaning of payment claim

(1)  A payment claim, for a progress payment, is a written document that—

(a)  identifies the construction work or related goods and services to which the progress payment relates; and

General principles

The test is not whether the claim explains every calculation, but whether the relevant construction work (and/or related goods and services) is sufficiently identified such that the basis of the claim is reasonably comprehensible to the recipient. In MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94, Dalton JA (Brown and Kelly JJ agreeing) said (adopting T & M Buckley Pty Ltd v 57 Moss Road Pty Ltd [2010] QCA 381):

[24] In determining whether or not a document identifies the work, goods and services to which the claim relates, the Courts take a practical, and not overly technical, attitude. In T & M Buckley Pty Ltd v 57 Moss Road Pty Ltd Philippides J, writing in this Court, said that the issue for determination was, "… not whether the payment claim explained in every respect the means by which a particular claim item had been calculated, but whether the relevant construction work or related goods and services was sufficiently identified … That is, whether the payment claim reasonably identified the construction work to which it related such that the basis of the claim was reasonably comprehensible to the applicant." It has been accepted by the Courts that, in deciding whether or not work has been sufficiently identified, the background of each of the parties "derived from their past dealings and exchanges of documentation" is to be taken into account.

In ascertaining whether the identification of construction work is reasonably comprehensible to the recipient, the following matters are usually relevant (among others, discussed below):

[37] In principle, I think, the requirement in s 13(2)(a) that a payment claim must identify the construction work to which the progress payment relates is capable of being satisfied where:

(1) The payment claim gives an item reference which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, is to be taken as referring to the contractual or other identification of the work;

(2) That reference is supplemented by a single line item description of the work;

(3) Particulars are given of the amount previously completed and claimed and the amount now said to be complete;

(4) There is a summary that pulls all the details together and states the amount claimed.

Degree of particularity in identifying construction works

The construction work (or related goods and services) must be identified with some degree of particularity. That is, the specific work the subject of the claim should be identified, rather than simply the general work that is the subject of the construction contract as a whole: Jemzone Pty Ltd v Trytan Pty Ltd (2002) 42 ACSR 42; [2002] NSWSC 395, [43].

The respondent should be capable of determining whether or not to pay the claim. "There must be sufficient specificity in the payment claim for its recipient actually to be able to identify a payment claim for the purpose of determining whether to pay": Nepean Engineering Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] NSWCA 409, [47]–[48] (Santow JA); see also Protectavale Pty Ltd v K2K Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1248, [12] (Finkelstein J) cited in KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178, [52] (Brown J); see alike observations in Richard Kirk Architect Pty Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corp [2012] QSC 117, [29] (Daubney J).

However, determining whether the construction work has been sufficiently "identified" should not be approached in an unduly technical manner: Hawkins Construction (Aust) Pty Ltd v Macs Industrial Pipework Pty Ltd [2002] NSWCA 136, [20] (Davies AJA).

If the payment claim merely consists of a few failures to identify construction work, but by and large the work is properly identified, the payment claim may not necessarily be invalid: Nepean Engineering Pty Ltd v Total Process Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2005] NSWCA 409, [37] (Santow J).

Factual and mathematical errors

Generally, whether the works have been sufficiently "identified" for the purpose of section 68(1)(a) is not to be assessed by reference to whether the payment claim is factually correct or has been calculated strictly in accordance with the contract: Denbrook Constructions Pty Ltd v CBO Developments Pty Ltd [2022] QDC 184, [66] (Porter KC DCJ).

Additionally, if the payment claim has some mathematical errors, that will not of itself invalidate the payment claim, unless the errors are of a nature which renders or contributes to the payment claim being incomprehensible. KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178, [43] (Brown J).

History of paying similar payment claims may be indicative of sufficient identification

In Isis Projects Pty Ltd v Clarence Street Pty Ltd [2004] NSWSC 714, Clarence Street (Developer) and Isis Projects (Builder) enter into a construction contract to refurbish and fit out a building at 50 Clarence Street, Sydney NSW 2000. The Developer failed to pay in full, or serve payment schedules in response to, payment claims 12 and 13 (PC12 and PC13), which consisted of a cover sheet and a tax invoice describing the work by one line items, and showing for each the original contract value, the amount of previous claims, the value of work to date and the percentage completed. The Developer contended PC12 and PC13 were not valid. The Builder contended the PCs were valid and the Developer's failure to issue payment schedules meant the PCs were payable in full. The Court held that the previous conduct of the Developer in having paid 11 previous payment claims of a similar nature showed that the Developer was capable of finding meaning in the Builder's identification of the works. Thus, that conduct supported the conclusion that PC12 and PC13 sufficiently identified the construction work to which their respective payment claims relate. See the findings of McDougal J at [38]:

[38] Where payment claims in that format have been used, apparently without objection, on 11 previous occasions, it is very difficult to understand how the use of the same format on the 12th and 13th occasions could be said not to comply with the requirements of s 13(2)(a). If payments claims in that format had sufficiently identified the construction work to which the progress payment claimed related on 11 previous occasions, I find it hard to understand how they would lose that character on the 12th and 13th occasion.

Case examples of what is not sufficient

MWB Everton Park

Percentages against broad trade headings without tethering to identifiable scopes/locations/activities will usually fail. In MWB Everton Park Pty Ltd v Devcon Building Co Pty Ltd [2024] QCA 94, the Court held a trade-summary/percentage approach did not identify the work for a 56-townhouse project:

[25] …The contract was for the construction of 56 townhouses. In those circumstances, it was all but meaningless to say that 5% of concreting or 12% of plumbing had been completed. More description was needed if the document was to sufficiently identify the construction work, related goods and services, for the purpose of s 68(1)(a).

That approach reflects Brown J's analysis in KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178, where a one-page "trade breakdown" with only categories and percentages – no particulars of the actual work – failed the identification limb:

[64] … Whatever form of claim a claimant chooses to adopt, it must identify in a reasonable way the construction work to which the claim relates. While the purpose of the scheme is to permit the quick resolution of payment claims, the claimant must at least be reasonably comprehensible, to permit the respondent to respond within the time frame provided under the Act. The payment claim in this case has failed to do so.

KDV Sport

The judgment in KDV Sport Pty Ltd v Muggeridge Constructions Pty Ltd [2019] QSC 178 helpfully provides an excerpt of the payment claim which, in that case, was found not to have identified the construction work to which it related:

[35] … The payment claim submitted by Muggeridge consisted of a one page document.[25] It contained 6 columns. The first was headed "trade breakdown", the second "Total Amount", the third "Total Paid to Date", the fourth "Total Claim % to Date", the fifth "Total Claimed Trade to Date" and the sixth "Progress Claim". An extract of the payment claim submitted, highlighting particular items which have been the subject of submissions, is as follows:

WUC– Site Project Student Accommodation Big 18 Chisholm Road Carrara QLD
Prior Payment Total Claim to Date This Claim
Trade Breakdown Total Amount Total Paid to Date Total claim % to date Total Claimed Trade to date Progress Claim 13
8 CONCRETE SUPPLY $229,454 $217,981 100% $229,454 $4,589
19 LANDSCAPING $25,000 $0 0% $0 $0

Practice tips

State the claimed amount

Pursuant to section 68(1)(b) of the BIF Act, a payment claim must state the amount of the progress payment that the claimant claims to be payable (the "claimed amount").

Section 68(1)(b) BIF Act – Meaning of payment claim
68 Meaning of payment claim

(1)  A payment claim, for a progress payment, is a written document that—

...

(b)  states the amount of the progress payment that the claimant claims to be payable (the claimed amount); and

General principles

The payment claim must indicate a specific dollar amount that is claimed. A payment claim that does not state a specific amount, or that states the amount in an ambiguous or unclear way, may not satisfy section 68(1)(b).

This requirement is generally straightforward in practice. The claimed amount is typically stated as a total figure, often accompanied by a breakdown of the individual items making up the claim.

The requirement to "state" the claimed amount does not mean the amount must be correct or calculated in accordance with the contract. The purpose is to inform the respondent of the amount claimed, so that the respondent can decide whether to pay, dispute, or partially accept the claim.

Request payment

Pursuant to section 68(1)(c), a payment claim must request payment of the claimed amount. This requirement is that the document, on its face, is a demand or request for payment.

Section 68(1)(c) BIF Act – Meaning of payment claim
68 Meaning of payment claim

(1)  A payment claim, for a progress payment, is a written document that—

...

(c)  requests payment of the claimed amount.

This requirement is generally satisfied by the inclusion of words such as "please pay", "payment is requested", or by the use of an invoice or tax invoice format that inherently requests payment. In practice, most payment claims in the building industry satisfy this requirement because they are presented as invoices or claims for payment.

Claim for a valid reference date

Section 75(1) of the BIF Act provides that a person who is or claims to be entitled to a progress payment may give a payment claim to the person who is or may be liable to make the payment. However, a payment claim may only be given for a "reference date" under the construction contract.

Section 71 BIF Act – Reference dates for payment claims
71 Reference dates for payment claims

(1)  A reference date, under a construction contract, is—

(a)  a date stated in, or worked out under, the contract as the date on which a claim for a progress payment may be made for construction work carried out or related goods and services supplied under the contract; or

(b)  if the contract does not provide for the matter—the last day of the named month in which the construction work was first carried out, or the related goods and services were first supplied, under the contract and the last day of each later named month.

What is a reference date?

A "reference date" is the date on which a payment claim may be made. The concept is critical because a payment claim can only be served for a reference date that has arisen. If no reference date has arisen, any payment claim served will be premature and potentially invalid.

The reference date is determined by the contract. If the contract states that claims may be made on the 25th of each month, then the 25th of each month is a reference date. If the contract is silent, section 71(1)(b) provides default reference dates: the last day of each month.

Only one payment claim per reference date

Section 75(4) of the BIF Act provides that only one payment claim may be given for each reference date under the construction contract. If a claimant serves more than one payment claim for the same reference date, the second (and any subsequent) claims may be invalid.

Section 75(4) BIF Act – Making payment claim
75 Making payment claim

(4)  A claimant can not give more than 1 payment claim for each reference date under the construction contract.

Whether a payment claim relates to a particular reference date is a question of substance, not form. The Courts will look at the substance of the claim to determine whether it is, in truth, a second claim for the same reference date.

Reference dates after termination

There is a question about whether reference dates continue to accrue after a construction contract has been terminated. The weight of authority suggests that reference dates cease to accrue after termination, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise.

Practice tips